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WIELDING THE BIG STICK: DETERRENCE AND THE
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Bradley C. Howard
Recent environmental disasters have focused public attention
on the effectiveness of environmental laws. As a result, legislators
and administrators have looked increasingly to the criminal
enforcement provisions of the major environmental laws to deter
destructive behavior. The Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989 brought
environmental enforcement to the forefront of public debate.7 In
response to the Valdez spill, Congress considered the Environmental
Crimes Act,2 which sought to criminalize actions that cause
catastrophic environmental disasters.3 Repeated discoveries of
medical waste on East Coast beaches in 1988 also outraged the public
and prompted a congressional response/
Statistics published by the National Survey of Crime Severity
have indicated that the public considers environmental crimes to be
as serious as many violent crimes.5 For example, the crime of
1. Leon, Environmental Criminal Enforcement: A Mushrooming Cloud, 63 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 679, 679 (1989).
2. The Environmental Crimes Act was introduced by Charles Schumer (D-
NY) and George Gekas (R-PA) in 1989 and was approved by the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice on March 29, 1990. H.R. 3641, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., 135 CONG. REC. D1338-1402 (1989). The bill would have made it a felony
to knowingly create a risk of death by polluting and would have imposed serious
criminal sanctions for knowingly or recklessly causing an environmental catastrophe.
Id.
3. Representative Schumer (D-NY) claimed that "we need a law that makes
a connection between the size of the environmental crime and the size of the
punishment." 48 CONG. Q. 990, 990 (Jan.- June 1990). The controversial legislation
died in the House Committee on the Judiciary in October 1990. See 21 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1375 (Nov. 16, 1990).
4. Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-582, 102 Stat. 2950,
2953-54 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6992 (West Supp. 1990)) (providing criminal
penalties for the improper handling or disposal of medical waste).
5. The National Survey of Crime Severity, conducted over a six-month period
in 1977 as a supplement to the National Crime Survey, ranked 204 specific criminal
events in order of severity as chosen by 60,000 persons participating in the survey.
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knowingly discharging waste into a water supply causing the illness
(but not hospitalization) of twenty people was ranked as more severe
than heroin smuggling, armed robbery and an intentional stabbing
where the victim required hospitalization.6
The developing federal enforcement strategy emphasizes more
criminal prosecutions and harsher punishments for environmental law
offenders. Sentencing guidelines have alerted the business community
that environmental defendants may serve significant jail terms. This
article examines criminal enforcement of environmental laws at the
federal level and discusses the deterrent effect of sentencing
guidelines. It also discusses the enforcement of environmental laws
in Virginia and proposes changes to strengthen the deterrent effect
of these laws in Virginia.
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
During the 1980s, Congress enacted several measures
strengthening the criminal penalties for violations of environmental
laws.7 These enactments established a statutory framework that
The survey was created and conducted by the Center for Studies in Criminology
and Criminal Law, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. BUREAU OF JUST.
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUST., NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY (1985).
6. Id. at vi-vii.
1. See, e.g., Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
616, § 232(a), 98 Stat. 3221, 3256 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)
(1988)) (increased penalties from the maximum of $25,000 per day per violation
to $50,000 per day per violation and increased maximum prison term to two years);
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §
109, 100 Stat. 1613, 1632 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988))
(increased the maximum prison term to three years); Water Quality Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 312, 101 Stat. 7, 42 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c) (1988)) (increased the maximum fine to $50,000 per day per violation and
increased the maximum prison term to three years); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-532, § 604 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988)) (increased the maximum fine for knowing
violations to $50,000 per day of violation); and Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 701, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104
Stat.) 2399, 2675 (increased penalties for knowing violations from a maximum of
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enabled enforcement agencies to prosecute serious polluters.8
In the early 1970s, major environmental legislation such as the
Clean Air Act9 and the Clean Water Act70 introduced complex
standards and regulations for controlling pollution. Conforming to
these new statutory mandates required the creation of a complex
administrative scheme77 and a federal environmental enforcement
strategy which, prior to 1981, relied almost exclusively on civil
remedies.72 Since the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
a newly created agency in the 1970s,73 criminal enforcement of new
and complex environmental statutes under its direction was perceived
as impractical and unfair.7'' The business community, therefore, was
given a chance to adjust to the new regulatory climate.75
two years imprisonment to a maximum of five years imprisonment).
8. Congress criminalized the polluting of rivers and harbors as early as 1899
when it enacted the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, Ch. 425, 30
Stat. 1121, 1151-55 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467(e) (1988)), but
violation of the act was only deemed a misdemeanor.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988). The first Clean Air Act was passed in 1963
and represented an early attempt by Congress to legislate pollution abatement.
Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). Later amendments
established many of the complex regulatory programs. See, e.g., Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
11. Habicht, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement:
How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,478 (Dec.
1987).
12. Id.
13. The EPA was created by consolidating into one regulatory agency duties
that had previously been performed by other agencies. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970,
35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970).
14. Habicht, supra note 11, at 10,478.
15. Id.
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By the late 1970s, however, civil penalties did not appear to
effectively deter corporate environmental damage/6 Some businesses
could absorb the imposition of civil penalties as a cost of doing
environmentally damaging business.77 In addition, some activities
resulted in such egregious environmental damage that a response
much stronger than civil penalties was deemed necessary.78 Widely
publicized environmental disasters such as Love Canal and Times
Beach further fueled the push towards a stronger enforcement
strategy.79
The EPA and the Department of Justice (DOJ) made stricter
criminal enforcement possible by adopting new priorities and
readjusting their organizational structures.20 In 1981, the EPA
established the Office of Criminal Enforcement.27 In the same year,
the DOJ created a special Environmental Crimes Unit within its Land
and Natural Resources Division.22 In 1982, the EPA and the FBI
16. A key element of deterrence as defined by the EPA is the "serious
consequences of detection." U.S. EPA OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE 26 (Mar. 1990) (informational pamphlet
published by the Office of Enforcement and available at the Office of Public
Information). Detection has no serious consequences for a company that is able
to absorb significant civil penalties and continue to be financially successful.
17. See McMurray & Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1133, 1143 (1986).
18. For example, in United States v. Distler, 9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,700 (W.D. Ky. 1979), aff'd, 671 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 827
(1981), the defendant company discharged toxic organic pollutants into Louisville
sewers in quantities that ultimately caused serious damage to the Ohio River. The
sentencing judge held that the seriousness of the offense required criminal penalties
of two years in prison and a $50,000 fine. See Celebrezze, Criminal Enforcement
of State Environmental Laws: The Ohio Solution, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 217,
221 (quoting Transcript of Sentencing at 10, United States v. Distler, Crim No. 77-
00108 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 14, 1979)).
19. Celebrezze, supra note 18, at 221.
20. Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental Wrongs, 15 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,065 (Mar. 1985).
21. Habicht, supra note 4, at 10,479.
22. Id.
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signed a Memorandum of Understanding that allowed the EPA to
refer a maximum of thirty cases a year to the FBI for investigation.23
The EPA began to hire full-time criminal investigators in the early
1980s, and in 1984, these investigators were given full law
enforcement powers as Special Deputy U.S. Marshals.24 The
Environmental Crimes Unit was elevated to the status of a section
within the DOJ's Land and Natural Resources Division in 1987.25
Interstate cooperation in the criminal enforcement of
environmental laws was encouraged in the 1980s by the creation of
regional enforcement projects. The first of these, the Northeast
Hazardous Waste Project,26 was created in 1980 and sought to
combine the resources of eleven charter member states in an attempt
to increase deterrence through improved enforcement efforts.27 The
EPA began funding this program in 1982.2S Over the next six years,
other states formed the Western States Hazardous Waste Project,
the Midwestern Hazardous Waste Associates, and the Southern
Environmental Enforcement Network.29
The four regional environmental enforcement organizations
23. Id. at 10,479 n.12.
24. Id. at 10,479 n.ll. From 1984 to 1988, the criminal investigators were
redeputized annually. In 1988, they were given permanent law enforcement powers
when Congress enacted the Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
582, § 4(a), 102 Stat. 2950, 2958 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3063 (West Supp.
1989)).
25. Habicht, supra note 11, at 10,479.
26. The project was initially created as the Northeast Hazardous Waste
Coordination Committee in 1980 as a result of a proposal by representatives from
the State of New Jersey. It was funded originally by the DOJ's Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration. See Wills & Murray, State Environmental Enforcement
Organizations, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Aug. 1989, at 3.
27. Id. The project now has 14 members.
28. Id.
29. Id. The four organizations cover the entire continental United States.
Currently, 40 states belong to one of the four projects. Virginia belongs to the
Northeast Hazardous Waste Project. Id.
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work closely with the EPA's National Enforcement Investigations
Center and the Office of Waste Program Enforcement.30 The
programs emphasize involvement by local prosecutors in criminal
enforcement efforts, strong communication between the different
states, close cooperation between state and federal enforcement
programs, and cooperative enforcement training among the states, the
EPA and the National Association of Attorneys General.57
FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL EFFORTS
The evolution of environmental enforcement strategy is
demonstrated by EPA and DOJ enforcement statistics. Between 1970
and 1980, only twenty-five criminal environmental cases were
prosecuted.52 In contrast, between 1983 and 1987, the DOJ secured
339 criminal environmental indictments.55 EPA case referrals
increased throughout the 1980s.5^ The number of defendants charged
and convicted, the length of time sentenced and served, and the
length of probations all increased sharply from 1982 to 1990.55
Title 18 Enforcement
The deterrent effect of a national criminal enforcement
program was furthered by the creative reliance on several traditional
30. Id.
31. Id. at 4-5.
32. Habicht, supra note 11, at 10,479.
33. Id.
34. Strock, EPA's Environmental Enforcement in the 1990s, 20 Envtl. L Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,327 (Aug. 1990).
35. EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring publishes an
annual report summarizing the highlights and statistics of their enforcement efforts
for the year. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE & MONITORING, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENT REPORT: FY
1989 [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT REPORT].
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criminal statutes found in Title 18 of the United States Code.56
These provisions include the Racketeer Influences Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO),57 conspiracy,58 aiding and abetting,59 and
mail fraud/" all of which help prosecutors secure longer sentences for
environmental crimes, and thus, foster deterrence/7
In United States v. Arcangelo,42 the EPA joined forces for the
first time with the DOJ Organized Strike Force and secured
significant prison sentences for two brothers under RICO and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)/5 Their disposal
of mercury at a demolition and salvage plant in North Haven,
Connecticut, resulted in a ten-year sentence for one brother and a
five-year sentence for the other/"'
In United States v. Hoflin,45 the defendant was convicted of
aiding and abetting the disposal of paint waste in violation of RCRA
and 18 U.S.C. § 2, which states that one who aids and abets a crime
may be prosecuted as a principal. Hoflin was prosecuted as a
principal for telling an employee to bury drums containing paint
36. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Crimes,
21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 821, 848-52 (1990).
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963 (1988).
38. Id. § 371.
39. Id. § 2.
40. Id. § 1341.
41. A defendant convicted of a conspiracy charge may be imprisoned for up
to five years and fined up to $10,000. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988). A defendant
convicted of a RICO charge may be imprisoned for up to 20 years. Id. § 1963. By
contrast, criminal provisions in environmental statutes provide penalties that are
not as harsh. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988) (maximum two years
imprisonment for violation of Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984);
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988) (maximum three years imprisonment for violations of
the Clean Water Act).
42. See ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 35, at 41.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
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waste.46
In United States v. Import Certification Laboratories, Inc.,47 three
defendants were charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States
because they filed false statements certifying that inspected vehicles
complied with air pollution control laws/8 Conviction under the
conspiracy statute allowed the imposition of a sentence much more
severe than allowable under the Clean Air Act before it was amended
in 1990.49
Criminal Enforcement in the 1990s
Increasingly severe views on environmentally damaging conduct
are forcing environmental regulatory agencies to strengthen their
criminal enforcement strategies. Although the presumption against
jailing first time offenders was once strong, a more aggressive criminal
enforcement strategy for environmental violations is becoming more
acceptable to judges and juries.50 Prosecutors around the country
have recognized that criminal prosecution is one of the best ways to
encourage corporations to comply with environmental laws.57
At the end of 1990, environmental regulators proudly
announced record increases in criminal prosecutions and civil and
46. Id. at 1035.
47. 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1993 (Jan. 8, 1988).
48. Id.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 371 provides criminal penalties for conviction of conspiracy of
up to five years. Before amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 701 provided for a maximum of
two years imprisonment for knowing violations of the Clean Air Act.
50. Habicht, supra note 11, at 10,478.
51. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1474 (Nov. 18, 1988). A panel of attorneys active
in criminal enforcement of environmental laws concluded that "although it is often
difficult to get juries to convict and sentence corporate executives who have
violated environmental laws, criminal prosecution is still the most cost-effective
method for reaching 'hard core" violators because penalties cannot be passed on to
the consumer." Id. at 1474.
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administrative penalty actions.52 They also predicted that the number
of criminal enforcement cases prosecuted by the DOJ would grow.55
Congress responded by passing the Pollution Prosecution Act, which
increases the number of civil and criminal investigators at EPA.54
Public of global environmental degradation may encourage
increased criminal enforcement efforts domestically. A recent United
Nations poll measuring public opinion and leadership attitudes in
fourteen nations on four continents revealed an alarming pessimism
about the future of the world environment.55 Increased debate over
the United States' responsibility for controlling environmental
deterioration should keep attention focused on criminal sanctions and
their role in deterring illegal pollution.
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The deterrent effect of criminal enforcement of environmental
statutes was increased greatly when the U.S. Sentencing Commission
promulgated general sentencing guidelines in 1987.56 The guidelines
were established to promote uniformity in federal sentencing so that
individuals convicted of similar crimes in similar circumstances would
52. See Strock, supra note 34, at 10,327.
53. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1714 (Feb. 2, 1990).
54. Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, § 201, reprinted
in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2954, 2962.
55. The United Nations Environment Programme, Public and Leadership
Attitudes to the Environment in Four Continents, May, 1989, reported in 10 Cong.
Res. Serv. R. 7, 26 (1989). Respondents from all of the countries expressed an
overwhelming belief that the condition of the world's environment will continue to
deteriorate over the next decade.
56. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N GUIDELINES MANUAL [hereinafter
GUIDELINES MANUAL]. The eight member commission was established by the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988), 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988), and the Commission's rules became effective on
November 1, 1987. The constitutionality of these guidelines was upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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be sentenced similarly.57 The Commission included environmental
violations in its catalog of crimes requiring application of the
guidelines.5* This elevates environmental offenses to the status of the
more traditional "serious crimes" and forces judges to sentence such
violations accordingly.59
The Sentencing Guidelines require a federal judge to impose
a sentence within a prescribed range depending on the level of the
crime for which the defendant has been convicted and the presence
of any "departure" factors.60 The judge looks to the Guidelines'
Sentencing Table to determine the range of sentences recommended
for that level of crime.6; The judge also considers factors that raise
or lower the level number before a range is applied.62 For example,
57. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 56, at ch.l, pt. A (policy statement). In
passing the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress sought a
reduction in sentencing disparities, the imposition of tougher penalties for certain
crimes and a limitation on the pernicious aspects of plea bargaining. See Applying
Formula to Justice, Sentencing Rules Limit Judge's Discretion, Washington Post, June
12, 1989, at Al, col 2.
58. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 56 § 2Q (Offenses Involving the
Environment). Section 2Q consists of three main environmental enforcement
sections and four environmentally related sections: § 2Q1.1 (Knowing
Endangerment Resulting from Mishandling Hazardous or Toxic Substances,
Pesticides or Other Pollutants); § 2Q1.2 (Mishandling of Hazardous or Toxic
Substances or Pesticides: Record keeping, Tampering, and Falsification); § 2Q1.3
(Mishandling of Other Environmental Pollutants: Record keeping, Tampering and
Falsification); § 2Q1.4 (Tampering or Attempted Tampering with Public Water
System); § 2Q1.5 (Threatened Tampering with Public Water System); § 2Q1.6
(Hazardous or Injurious Devices on Federal Lands); and § 2Q2.1 (Specially
Protected Fish, Wildlife and Plants: Smuggling and Otherwise Unlawfully Dealing
in Fish, Wildlife, and Plants).
59. Star & Kelly, Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines, 20 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl L. Inst.) 10,096 (Mar. 1990), updated in NAT'L ENVTL.
ENFORCEMENT J., June 1990, at 3.
60. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 56 § 5K2.0 (Grounds for Departure).
Each offense categorized by the Commission is given a base offense level number.
Id.
61. Id. § 5A (Sentencing Table).
62. Id. § lBl.l(c)-(f) (Application Instructions).
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if the defendant willfully obstructed the criminal enforcement
proceedings giving rise to the trial, an upward adjustment of two
levels could be imposed during sentence calculation.6-* On the other
hand, if the defendant demonstrated "a recognition and affirmative
acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct," then
a two-level downward adjustment could be made.64
Under the Guidelines, the sentencing judge retains discretion
as to the application of the "departure" factor adjustments. The
judge also has discretion to depart completely from the suggested
range if the Guidelines fail to account for factors which exist in the
specific case.65
When sentencing an environmental offender, a federal judge
must first apply the Guidelines section under which the convicted
offense falls,66 which requires an analysis of the underlying acts giving
rise to the criminal enforcement action. The Sentencing Guidelines
address environmental crimes in three sections:67 first, violating the
knowing endangerment provisions of RCRA6* and the Clean Water
Act;69 second, mishandling hazardous or toxic substances;70 and third,
mishandling "other pollutants."77
63. Id. § 3C1.1 (Willfully Obstructing or Impeding Proceedings).
64. Id. § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility).
65. Id. § 5K2.0 (Grounds for Departure). This discretion was considered by
the court in United States v. Bogas, 731 F. Supp 242, 245 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531, 1537 (6th Cir. 1989)
(applying Guidelines Application Instructions, § lB1.2(a)).
67. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 56, pt. Q (Offenses Involving the
Environment).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988).
69. The knowing endangerment provision of the Clean Water Act is set forth
in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988). The sentence for violating either of these
provisions in RCRA or the Clean Water Act is addressed in GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 56, § 2Q1.1.
70. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 56, § 2Q1.2.
71. Id. § 2Q1.3.
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Each section contains a base offense level, as well as specific
offense characteristics with designated level adjustment values. If
applicable, these values are added or subtracted to the base level.
For example, mishandling of toxic waste requires a base offense level
of eight.72 If the mishandled waste resulted in a "substantial
likelihood of death or serious bodily injury," the base level would be
increased by nine levels,73 which then would put the sentencing range
at level seventeen. Adjustments are also allowed for offenses
involving continuous, repetitive discharges7^ or permit violations.75
Other adjustments are based upon the potential seriousness of the
environmental harm76 or the actual consequences of the offense.77
After these characteristics are utilized to modify the base
offense level, further adjustments are made according to departure
rules that apply to all crimes listed in the Guidelines. These rules
include departures based upon a defendant's acceptance of
responsibility,78 a defendant's behavior during the environmental
investigation,79 and a defendant's culpability or level of participation
in the specific crime.80 Finally, the criminal history of the defendant
is considered.87 The resulting offense number is plugged into the
Sentencing Table to determine the range that will direct the judge's
eventual sentence.82
72. Id. § 2Q1.2(a).
73. Id. § 2Q1.2(b)(2).
74. Id. § 2Q1.2(b)(l)(A), 3(b)(l)(A).
75. Id. § 2Q1.2(b)(4), -3(b)(4).
76. Id. § 2Q1.2(b)(2), .3(b)(2).
77. Id. § 2Q1.2(b)(3), .3(b)(3).
78. Id. § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility).
79. Id. § 3C1.1 (Willfully Obstructing or Impeding Proceedings).
80. Id. § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role).
81. Id. § IBl.l(f) (Application Instructions).
82. Id. § 5A.
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Application of the Guidelines
In a recent criminal prosecution under the Clean Water Act,
William B. Ellen of Mathews, Virginia, was convicted for illegally
filling federally protected wetlands in Maryland with material
considered a pollutant.*5 Ellen was convicted of mishandling
environmental pollutants other than toxic wastes,84 which offense
starts with a base level of six.85
Because Ellen's offense resulted in an "ongoing, continuous or
repetitive discharge, release or emission" of the pollutant into the
environment, the base level was adjusted upward by six levels.86 The
offense also involved a discharge without a permit, requiring an
additional increase of four more levels.87 Ellen, therefore, is saddled
with an offense level of sixteen, which requires incarceration for
twenty-one to twenty-seven months without the possibility of parole.88
Recent sentences imposed by judges using the guidelines
indicate a trend towards harsher penalties and increased jail time for
violations of environmental laws. In a Missouri case,89 Walter
Carolan pled guilty to charges of falsifying records required under the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).90 The false records pertained
to the disposal of PCB transformers and capacitators by Carolan's
83. United States v. Ellen, CR. No. 5-90-0215 (D. Md. Jan. 4, 1991). See also
NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. Mar. 1991, at 29.
84. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 56, § 2Q1.3. This section was used to
determine a sentence for Ocie Mills and his son in 1989. The Mills had also
illegally filled protected wetlands and were the first environmental polluters
subjected to the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Mills, 88 Crim. 03100
(N.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 1989).
85. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 56, § 2Q1.3(a).
86. Id. § 2Q1.3(b)(l)(A).
87. Id. § 2Q1.3(b)(4).
88. Id. § 5A (Sentencing Table).
89. United States v. Carolan, No. 89-00045-01/04-Cr-W-JWO (W.D. Mo. 1990)
(cited in Star & Kelly, supra note 59, at 12).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988).
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company, Rose Chemical.97 Carolan was sentenced to two years
imprisonment.92
In a recent Massachusetts case, the defendants, John Wells and
his company, were charged with knowingly discharging hazardous
wastewater into a city sewer system in violation of Clean Water Act
Wastewater Pretreatment Standards.95 Wells was ordered to pay
$60,000 to the city of Lowell, and was sentenced to fifteen months in
04prison.
In a similar case, John Borowski was convicted of violating the
knowing endangerment provisions of the Clean Water Act by illegally
discharging toxic materials into a sewer system.95 Borowski was
sentenced to twenty-six months imprisonment and was ordered to pay
personally a fine of $400,000.96 His company, Burjohn Optical, also
was assessed a $50,000 fine and ordered to pay $15,000 to two
employees for medical health insurance.97
Guidelines as a Deteirenl
Because parole has been abolished, environmental criminals
likely will spend more time in jail due to the Sentencing Guidelines.98
Also, judges may no longer impose a sentence on a convicted
environmental criminal and then suspend it.99 Commentators have
91. See Star & Kelly, supra note 59, at 12.
92. Carolan was also subjected to a Title 18 enforcement action. He was
charged and convicted of conspiracy to defraud the EPA in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371. He was given a $10,000 fine and sentenced to two years imprisonment (to
be served concurrently with the two years received for the TSCA violation).
93. United States v. Wells Metal Finishing, Inc., Cr. 89-144-N (D. Mass. 1990).
94. Star & Kelly, supra note 59, at 12.
95. United States v. Borjohn Optical Technology, Inc., No. Cr. 89-256 WD (D.
Mass. Nov. 7, 1990).
96. NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Dec. 1990/Jan. 1991, at 31.
97. Id.
98. Star & Kelly, supra note 59, at 4.
99. Id.
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warned environmental practitioners that compliance constitutes the
best counsel.700 Because recent enforcement efforts have enhanced
detection, "[s]laps on the wrist . . . may soon be replaced by several
years of imprisonment,"707 and many potential environmental criminals
may be deterred.
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT IN VIRGINIA
Administration and enforcement of environmental law in
Virginia is accomplished through a complex state regulatory system
with significant direction from federal regulatory agencies.702 Every
major state environmental program is supervised by a board of seven
to nine individuals appointed by the Governor.705 These boards
promulgate regulations, decide specific cases, and direct activities of
the state agencies./(W The state agencies705 implement board
directives, perform formal and informal rulemaking, promote broad
environmental goals and monitor compliance with media-specific
environmental laws.706 The state's Secretary of Natural Resources
100. See, e.g., Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and the Regulation of the
Environment 375, 379 (paper presented at ALI-ABA Environmental Law
Conference, Washington, D.C., Feb. 14-16, 1991); see also Fromm, supra note 36,
at 824; Star & Kelly, supra note 59, at 4.
101. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2131 (Feb. 10, 1989) (quoting Donald A. Carr,
acting Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department's Land and Natural
Resources Division).
102. Mays & Valentine, THE VIRGINIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK
(1990) [hereinafter VIRGINIA HANDBOOK] 1.2-1.3.
103. Virginia has four citizen boards that oversee major environmental
programs: The State Water Control Board, the Virginia Waste Management Board,
the State Air Pollution Control Board, and the Virginia Board of Health.
104. VIRGINIA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 1.6-1.7.
105. The major state environmental agencies are the Virginia Department of
Air Pollution Control, the Department of Waste Management, the Virginia Water
Control Board, and the Virginia Department of Health.
106. For example, the statute establishing the Virginia Water Control Board
provides that the agency is to "promote water resource conservation . . . to provide
for the health, safety, and welfare of the present and future citizens of the
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oversees all of the citizen boards and agencies and reports directly to
the Governor as a cabinet-level officer/07
The Virginia Council on the Environment is an administrative
body whose function is to develop uniform management policies for
all environmental agencies.708 The Council is composed of chairmen
from the citizen boards and directors of these agencies.709 The
Council reports to the Governor and the General Assembly biennially
on the state of environmental program management in Virginia.770
Methods of environmental law enforcement vary depending on
the particular agency involved. Air pollution control and hazardous
waste management are accomplished by agencies with the statutory
power to force compliance through administrative compliance
orders.777 The agencies may also initiate judicial proceedings through
the Attorney General in an attempt to secure civil penalties,
declaratory judgments or other appropriate relief.772
Criminal enforcement of state environmental laws has been
given greater emphasis in recognition of the federal trend and
growing public concern about the environment.775 In 1990, the
Commonwealth." VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.2 (1990). See VIRGINIA HANDBOOK,
supra note 102, at 1.9.
107. VIRGINIA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 1.6; VA CODE ANN. § 2.1-51.7, -
51.8:1 (1990).
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1201 (1990).
109. Id.
110. VIRGINIA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 1.7-1.8.
111. The State Air Pollution Control Board is authorized to enforce the
provisions of the Virginia Air Pollution Control Law. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1307
(1990). Both the Virginia Waste Management Board and Department are
empowered to enforce the Virginia Waste Management Act. Id. § 10.1-1402, -
1405 (1990).
112. VIRGINIA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 7.28-7.29.
113. The Virginia Attorney General successfully offered several legislative
proposals to the General Assembly in 1990 that strengthened agency enforcement
powers. See, e.g., S. 464 (expanding Department of Waste Management
enforcement authority and increasing severity of penalties to match federal laws);
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Virginia Code was amended to increase criminal penalties for
knowing violations of hazardous waste laws and water control laws.774
Proposals for Increased Deterrence
Environmental degradation in Virginia might be deterred
significantly if criminal sanctions for environmental violations are
increased. Knowing violations of the state air pollution control law,775
safe drinking water law,776 and wetlands protection law777 now
constitute only misdemeanor offenses.
Increased effectiveness of enforcement efforts also could
promote deterrence. In Virginia, each agency currently promotes and
implements its own enforcement strategies.778 An administrative
reorganization that consolidates environmental enforcement resources
and personnel could enhance the quality of environmental
protection.779 Although all agencies now answer to the Secretary of
Natural Resources, they perform daily activities independently of
central guidance and implement enforcement priorities without regard
S. 465 (increasing civil penalties for water pollution to match federal penalties).
114. Section 10.1-1455 of the Virginia Code was amended in 1990. 1990 Va.
Acts c. 919 (allowing a maximum criminal penalty of 525,000 for each violation of
specific Virginia hazardous waste laws and an increase in the maximum period of
incarceration from one to five years). Section 62.1-444.32 of the Virginia Code was
also amended. 1990 Va. Acts c. 13 (allowing a maximum criminal penalty of
$25,000 for each violation of the state water control law).
115. Virginia Air Pollution Control Law, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1300-1322
(1990).
116. Virginia Public Water Supply Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-167-176
(1990).
117. Virginia Wetlands Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.1 to -13.20 (1990).
118. See VIRGINIA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 1.8.
119. See Murphy, Environmental Enforcement: Michigan's Approach, NAT'L
ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Oct. 1988, at 8.
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to the actions of other state agencies/20
Finally, lowering the requisite criminal mental state from
"knowing" to "reckless" could increase deterrence by subjecting a
broader range of environmentally damaging behavior to serious
criminal punishment/"7 by increasing the incentive to responsible
parties to abide by environmental laws and by lessening the confusion
caused by differing interpretations of the "knowing" standard.
CONCLUSION
Legislators and administrators have responded to
environmental degradation by focusing on the criminal penalties for
en-vironmental law violations. Congress has strengthened the criminal
sanctions of environmental laws and federal administrators have
increased their pursuit of environmental criminals. Adoption of
sentencing guidelines has also added strength to the criminal
enforcement regime. The United States Sentencing Commission's
specific treatment of environmental crimes lent credibility to the
contention that crimes which damage the environment are serious and
warrant significant punishment. Proper application of the guidelines
ensures that criminal polluters will serve real jail time.
The trend towards harsher penalties and stricter criminal
enforcement is fueled by the hope that strict and predictable
punishment will deter future environmental crime. Further protection
of the environment may be achieved if states toughen environmental
statutes and structure effective criminal enforcement programs.
120. The fact that the General Assembly has created the Council on
Environmental Quality indicates a recognition that uniformity in management is
desirable.
121. One solution to the problem of confused interpretations of the "knowing"
standard is to adopt a different requisite mental state. In Ohio, the General
Assembly modified state law so that a "reckless" mental state satisfied the mens rea
requirement for felony conviction under state environmental laws. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3734.99 (Baldwin 1988). This change was defended by the Ohio
State Attorney General. See Celebre/y.e, supra note 18, at 227.
